Methodology

Methodology & Sources

What IQ Mosaic is (and isn't)

IQ Mosaic is an original cognitive-challenge app for iPhone, built for entertainment and education. It presents 50 mixed-domain reasoning questions across five domains — abstract, verbal, logic, quantitative, and spatial — plus two short optional subtests (a working-memory digit-span task and a 60-second processing-speed task). From your performance it produces a self-referenced Cognitive Profile: a picture of how you did across the app's own sections, with an estimated score shown alongside an honest margin of error.

We want to be upfront about the limits, because they matter:

What follows is an honest account of how the questions are actually built and quality-controlled, and of the established cognitive science each question type draws on. Where we cite a foundational test (e.g., Raven's, Wechsler's), we cite it to credit the paradigm our item formats follow — never to claim we are that instrument.

How we build the questions

Every question in the app comes from one master pool (currently 260 deduplicated items across 95 item families), assembled into the bundled bank the app ships. Two generation tracks feed that pool, and both are gated by the same correctness philosophy: an item only ships if its answer can be defended and a blind solver who never sees the key still picks it.

The five domains and their families

The pool spans all five domains (live counts: quant 47, logic 48, abstract 61, spatial 56, verbal 48), at three author-labeled difficulty tiers (easy 91 / medium 107 / hard 62). Representative families:

Two short subtests sit outside the 50 and are reported as separate raw indices, never folded into the main score: Working Memory (backward digit span) and Processing Speed (60-second symbol search).

Track 1 — Deterministic generation (answers correct by construction)

A fixed-seed deterministic generator builds the deterministic items. The defining property: the generator computes every answer rather than authoring it. Percentages, means, ratios, alphabet-position sequences, coordinate transforms, and cube-face counts are all derived in code, so the key is correct by construction. Each family is a function returning a question; a declared PLAN sets how many of each family and difficulty to make, and the driver retries, discarding any item whose options collide.

This track also produces all the visual items, because LLMs cannot reliably emit valid figure-spec JSON. Visual items are emitted as a compact FigureSpec (shape kind, rotation, fill, size, placement, mirror, dashed) matching the app's Swift Codable schema and rendered by a dependency-free SwiftUI Canvas.

Track 2 — AI item-invention loop (text only)

An automated process runs an "inventor" agent per domain that proposes new text-item families. An explicit avoid-list steers it away from families already covered, so each round reaches for fresher forms; it loops until a target batch survives verification. This track is text-only by design.

Correctness QA: blind double-solve

The central correctness gate is independent blind re-solving, applied to both tracks:

Guards against the ways items go wrong

Variety and difficulty controls

What each question type measures — and what it's modeled on

For every type below: the items are original, written in the tradition of the named paradigm. They are not that paradigm's actual test, and naming a paradigm implies no endorsement by its authors or publishers.

Abstract / matrix reasoning

Our item: a 2×2 or 3×3 grid of abstract figures with the bottom-right cell missing; you infer the rule(s) governing change across rows and columns and pick the figure that completes the matrix. Difficulty rises as more simultaneous rules must be tracked. All original artwork.

What it taps: fluid reasoning (Gf) — perceiving abstract relations, inferring governing rules, and applying them to novel visual problems with little reliance on verbal or cultural knowledge. Matrix reasoning is among the strongest single indicators of the general factor g.

Modeled on: the matrix / pattern-completion tradition of Raven's Progressive Matrices (Penrose & Raven, 1936; Raven, 1938), with item design following the rule-based cognitive account of Carpenter, Just & Shell (1990) and the construct-driven generative approach of Embretson (1998).

Verbal reasoning

Our item: four-term verbal analogies ("A is to B as C is to ?"), synonym/antonym choices, and semantic-relation items (category, part-whole, function, degree), with distractors built from near-synonym traps and surface-feature lures.

What it taps: crystallized / verbal-comprehension ability (Gc) — the breadth of acquired language knowledge and the capacity to perceive and re-apply the relation linking a word pair.

Modeled on: the componential analogy paradigm of Sternberg (1977) — encoding, inference, mapping, application — and the structure-mapping account of analogy of Gentner (1983), organized within the Cattell-Horn-Carroll framework (Cattell, 1963; Carroll, 1993).

Logic / deductive reasoning

Our item: short deductive problems — categorical syllogisms, conditional (if-then) arguments testing valid forms (modus ponens, modus tollens) against classic fallacies (affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent), and "which conclusion necessarily follows" items. Distractors are built from common reasoning errors (illicit conversion, plausible-but-invalid conclusions).

What it taps: deductive / relational reasoning — drawing conclusions that necessarily follow from premises and distinguishing valid inference from seductive fallacy; a core component of fluid reasoning.

Modeled on: the mental-models theory of syllogistic reasoning of Johnson-Laird (1983), the conditional-reasoning tradition of Wason (1968), and the deduction-paradigm review of Evans (2002), which informs our realistic distractor design.

Quantitative reasoning

Our item: text-based number problems — number-series completion, proportional/ratio reasoning, arithmetic word problems, and quantitative comparisons, each with one defensibly correct answer.

What it taps: numerical/quantitative reasoning — detecting and applying numeric rules and proportional relationships; novel number series tap inductive/fluid reasoning, while computation taps learned number facility.

Modeled on: the number-facility and induction factors identified by Thurstone (1938) and catalogued in the ETS Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman & Dermen, 1976), within the fluid-reasoning framework of Cattell (1963) and Carroll (1993).

Spatial reasoning

Our item: (a) mental-rotation sets where you judge whether block figures are the same object rotated versus a mirror image, and (b) paper-folding / hole-punch items where you pick the correct unfolded result. All figures are app-generated original art; rotation items include a deliberate mirror-reflection distractor.

What it taps: visuospatial ability (Gv) — mentally rotating, folding, and transforming objects and holding the result in the mind's eye; a factor distinct from verbal and quantitative ability and a strong predictor of STEM achievement.

Modeled on: the mental-rotation paradigm of Shepard & Metzler (1971) and its group-administered multiple-choice format from Vandenberg & Kuse (1978); and the Paper Folding (VZ-2) visualization format from the ETS Kit (Ekstrom et al., 1976) and Thurstone's Space factor (Thurstone, 1938). The real-world relevance of spatial ability is documented by Wai, Lubinski & Benbow (2009), and its trainability by Uttal et al. (2013) — paradigm-level findings about the literature, not validated claims about this app's scores.

Working memory (backward digit span)

Our subtest: digits are shown one at a time (each ~0.85s on, ~0.3s gap); you then enter them in reverse order. It is adaptive — starting at span 3, two trials per level, advancing one digit on at least one success, capped at span 9 — and the score is the longest span reversed correctly.

What it taps: working memory — holding a sequence in mind while actively reordering it, recruiting the phonological loop and central-executive control.

Modeled on: the backward digit-span task historically associated with the Wechsler scales (Wechsler, 1939), interpreted through the multicomponent working-memory model of Baddeley & Hitch (1974; Baddeley, 2003). As Conway et al. (2005) note, simple backward span is a lighter working-memory measure than full complex-span tasks — so we describe it as "in the tradition of" working-memory assessment, not a definitive capacity measure.

Processing speed (symbol search)

Our subtest: a fixed 60-second speeded block — a target symbol on the left, a row of symbols on the right; you tap Yes/No whether the target appears, as fast and accurately as you can. Symbols reuse the app's visual-figure renderer. The score is net correct (correct minus errors) over the timed block.

What it taps: processing speed — efficiency of visual scanning, attention, and rapid same/different decisions under time pressure; how quickly simple cognitive operations are executed.

Modeled on: the symbol-search / digit-symbol-coding family of timed tasks historically associated with the Wechsler scales (Wechsler, 1939) and the processing-speed theory of cognition of Salthouse (1996).

The frameworks behind the design

The whole app is organized by the mainstream science of cognitive abilities. The general factor g (Spearman, 1904) explains why diverse reasoning tasks correlate — the basis for an overall profile. The fluid-versus-crystallized distinction (Cattell, 1963; Horn & Cattell, 1966) explains why we separate novel-reasoning items (abstract, logic, quantitative series, spatial) from knowledge-based items (verbal). And the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) three-stratum taxonomy (Carroll, 1993; synthesized by McGrew, 2009) gives the hierarchy we use to label domains: g over broad abilities (Gf, Gc, Gv, quantitative reasoning) over specific item types.

For how the items are produced and audited, the app follows the established discipline of Automatic Item Generation (AIG): turning a cognitive model of a construct into a template ("item model") with controlled variables that a computer instantiates into many parallel items. This is a peer-reviewed methodology (Bejar, 2002; Embretson & Yang, 2006; Gierl, Lai & Turner, 2012; Gierl & Haladyna, 2013), not an ad-hoc shortcut. The quality-control layer is modeled on standard psychometrics — classical item analysis via difficulty p-values and point-biserial discrimination (Crocker & Algina, 1986), internal-consistency reliability via Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1951), the standard error of measurement and true-score reasoning of classical test theory (Lord & Novick, 1968), and item response theory for difficulty/discrimination modeling (Embretson & Reise, 2000).

Finally, as a precedent for generated and openly-licensed cognitive items, we point to the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) (Condon & Revelle, 2014) — a credible, public-domain item set. We use ICAR only as a conceptual benchmark for item format and open practice; we do not administer ICAR's items, nor any proprietary battery, and we claim no affiliation with any of them.

How we score

Today's score is self-referenced and provisional — and the app says so on screen.

The app computes a difficulty-weighted percent correct. It reads a bundled norms file, but the shipped artifact has status "none" (no real data yet), so scoring falls back to provisional constants: it converts your weighted percent to a z-score against placeholder values, scales it to an IQ-style number, and derives a percentile from a normal-curve approximation. The results screen frames this honestly as an estimated score, scaled against app users rather than the general population or any clinical sample, and the on-screen note says "placeholder scoring" while the status is "none."

We show the uncertainty rather than hide it. The app uses a deliberately conservative provisional reliability of 0.80, which yields a standard error of measurement and a wide 95% confidence band shown with every score. This is a placeholder until reliability is measured from real data.

The path to real norms is built but data-gated. When a real norms file (built from collected sittings) is bundled, scoring switches automatically — z-scored against the observed mean and spread, with percentiles from the empirical distribution. Sample-size gates keep claims honest: status stays "none" below ~200 sittings, "provisional" (clearly labeled) up to ~1,500, and only then moves toward "stable." A full psychometric pipeline — item analysis, reliability (alpha as a conservative lower bound, split-half, SEM), and IRT calibration — is built but inactive today (calibration is empty; no IRT has run). Pre-registered data-cleaning rules are fixed in code before any norms could be computed.

On privacy: the shipped app collects and transmits nothing. Research logging is off; the response log, uploader, ingest server, and analysis pipeline are dormant scaffolding for a possible future opt-in, consent-gated research mode. Everything above about real norms is contingent on that future, consented data — and even then, results would always be app-user-referenced, never census-representative.

The paid report, when generated, derives only self-referenced reads from a single sitting: per-domain weighted score and median response time, your strongest domain versus relative blind spot, a speed-versus-accuracy quadrant relative to your own median pace, and a difficulty curve. It is explicit that with roughly 10 items per domain these are directional reads of one sitting, not fixed traits.

What this is — and what it isn't

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